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Some philosophers say that it is not appropriate to engage in philosophy per se with children 
because philosophy is a discipline, requiring first a course of preparation, involving perhaps 
the study of grammar, logic, the proper use of language, the establishment of claims, 
evidences, warrants and ultimately arguments that can stand up to scrutiny. In an era of 
accountability, this has come to be cashed out in some kind of procedure where competencies 
ae identified, tagged and checked. Philosophy on this reading is no exception to this general 
requirement for all disciplines. John White, has pointed to the difference between 
conversations per se and philosophical conversations, arguing quite rightly that the mere 
organisation of children in a circle and setting them a topic for discussion cannot be called 
philosophy, nor does it lead them in any significant way into philosophy, but rather fosters a 
confusion between just general talk and the formation of a philosophical attitude (White, 
2011). Indeed White if articulating the classical view extending as far back as Plato’s 
academy that some kind of preparation for philosophy is required. A classical philosopher 
like Kant, for instance, pointed at the beginning of his first Critique to a set vocabulary of 
terms like ‘sensibility’, ‘transcendental’ and ‘pure reason’ ‘practical reason’, all of which 
would need to be competently controlled, if not entirely mastered, before engaging in his new 
transcendental philosophy of reason. Philosophers like Aristotle and Aquinas well understood 
the need for preparation also and while they each in different ways collected arguments like 
experimental samples and paraded them before listeners/ readers before arguing for one 
preferred solution, they assumed a certain literacy to begin with. And Matthew Lipman, in his 
own structured way,  presented, in the philosophical materials he designed for children, a 
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type of path to follow in order to guide children away from mindless chatter. By means of an 
active community of inquiry, Lipman set out to present once again a familiar tradition of 
thoughts and dilemmas embedded in the tradition but opponents might say that  this could 
result in the mere mimicry of a process by children not yet capable of engaging in the real 
thing, an argument well outlined in John White’s latest piece.  
 
If we call this the ‘competence’ position, meaning that advocates of this position argue 
that some measure of competence in argument construction or lexical control is prerequisite, 
then we can see that this view stems from the views of John Wilson, Paul Hirst and others 
who have argued along similar lines (Kennedy and Kennedy, 2011; Law, 2008; Wilson, 
1963). The assumption of this position is that philosophy itself is a stable species with its own 
fixed methods and methods of elaboration, control of which marks off the ‘adequate’ from 
the ‘inadequate’ practice of philosophy. John White and others want to avoid commonplace 
ideas masquerading as philosophy and so they insist on defending the idea of philosophy as a 
consistent and ‘precise’ theoretical construct limited in its scope perhaps but defined 
nonetheless in its method and in the scientific support required for its maintenance. Some 
‘competence’ theorists have taken this a step further to require not only the proper 
formulation of questions but also the proper formulation of solutions. They have argued for 
greater forms of precision, dismissing perhaps too readily elements of vagueness in the 
formulation of arguments as signs of immaturity or lack of mastery. Once pushed this far, the 
proper cognitive/ moral connection is somewhat lost sight of and philosophy appears as a 
rigorous cognitive science. Indeed Michael Hand, as I read him, represents this more 
exaggerated view, making control of a form of inquiry prerequisite to the ultimate degree: 
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To be competent in a form of inquiry is not just a matter of asking questions of a particular  
kind: it is a matter of answering questions of a particular kind by means of appropriate 
methods of investigation (Hand, 5) 
 
There seem to be two main objections to this position, one based on the realities of 
educational practice and the other on current disputes about the nature of an academic 
discipline.  
 
The first objection is animated by the experience of educators who argue that 
‘competence’ is not a prerequisite for learning, even if it is taken sometimes as a measure of 
learning. Educators point to the realities of imprecision in the way children access and 
achieve control of information and attitudes. For them learning in the classroom is never an 
exact science because no matter how well planned their activities with children may be, no 
matter how logically coherent in a Herbartian sense this subject matter is presented, there is a 
serious imprecision in the learning achieved, hence precipitating the need for assessment and 
checking of learning which is the bread and butter of everyday life in the classroom. Learning 
involves both the precision of the ‘competence theorists’ in a certain way but also a tolerance 
for the imprecision and errors of learners, even extending to fuzzy ideas about method. We 
might refer rather unattractively to supporters of this position for the sake of brevity as 
‘incompetence theorists’. ‘Incompetence’ theorists of science, for instance, are clear that 
basic scientific ideas must be presented in rounded-off form, perhaps in a manner that is 
simplified and critically distorted by the standards of the discipline so as not to frighten the 
child off or undermine his confidence. Teachers do this as a matter of course in order to fill 
the child with confidence and to give the impression that science is fun and easy. As a result, 
it is quite normal for children to be introduced to these hard sciences in very imprecise ways, 
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ways that match the science to their interest or their imaginary interest.  In this way the 
biography of the child blends in more seamlessly with objective concerns and the skilful 
teacher develops the child’s interest aided by this imprecision. Who does not remember a 
chemistry set offered as a gift at Christmas time or a Lego set or a face-painting set for make-
up or a kitchen set with plastic plates and teacups? No one is suggesting that all children will, 
as a result of these ‘toys’, come to have an interest in corresponding adult activities. And yet 
no one objects to these toys on the basis that the chemistry set is not real chemistry or the 
microscope set is not real biology or the prism game not real physics. These toys do not 
present materials according to the proper methods and procedures of the adult science. This 
leads to the question about what might support philosophy in this ‘toy’ stage. What do 
beginners, even adult beginners do, when they ‘toy’ with ideas. Could ‘toying with ideas’ 
actually count as a propaedeutic (propaideuein ‘to teach beforehand’) to engagement in true 
philosophy? Murris and Haynes describe their classroom discussions as a ‘string of spaghetti’ 
((Haynes and Murris, 2001, 292). The children’s comments generally have ‘fuzzy meanings’ 
(Murris, 2008,106) that distinguish them from the refined formulas of properly scientific 
ideas. Even if questions can be asked scientifically, they conceal other questions which only 
have a vague disciplinary origin and may be as much fantasy as reality, pointing perhaps to 
psychological or historical roots in the child’s life. Sometimes circumstantial and ‘incoherent’ 
distractions open on to questions of philosophical interest about the world, as they do with all 
subject interests and these are difficult to predict or plan. Coping with this vagueness, Karin 
Murris’ advice is to use picture books in the classroom as a way of opening up this space of 
inquiry, an indeterminate space which points to Murris’ attempt to liberate philosophy from 
the perpetual search for ‘right’ answers (Murris, 2000). 
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James Conroy has attempted to resolve the disagreement between what I am calling here 
the ‘competence’ theorists and the ‘incompetence’ theorists (Conroy, 2008). He advocates a 
return to the well tested method of presenting a history of ideas but this lands us back in the 
same dilemma well identified by the ‘competence’ theorists because the authentic texts of 
Descartes or Kant are not very accessible without proper training. The real problem is that 
philosophy does not deal with the management of ideas taken from other minds but, as 
Deleuze and Guattari explain, with the invention of concepts. Concepts are a special species 
that do not arise from a quandary in someone else’s head. The problem is that the adolescent 
(or the college student, for that matter) who tries to grapple with Aristotle or Descartes tends 
to respond in very formulaic ways until she relates to the problems these thinkers faced and 
relates these problems to her contemporary experience. Unless the problematic element has 
some bearing on her own creative questions and her ongoing attempts to make sense of her 
life, the excursion into the great thinkers does her no immediate service. If she is bright she 
may well develop formulaic mastery over a species of knowledge but the disappointing thing 
is that such an approach to philosophy has shifted her away from the territory of her own 
thoughts. The position of Deleuze, however, is that philosophy only arises out of one’s own 
internal territory or at least the dialectical process linking interior events to exterior events in 
the young inquiring mind. I will come shortly to Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of 
philosophy in their 1994 book, What is philosophy in order to elaborate on the second 
argument against the ‘competence’ theorists. But first a preliminary remark. 
 
I  Art or Science? 
 
The problem of vagueness or precision is not new in the history of philosophy. Obviously it 
is not possible here to go into too much detail on the matter but certain elements from the past 
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are nonetheless fruitfully glimpsed. Aristotle judged the separation of reason from experience 
as generally unwise because reasoning without experience leads to the eclipse of wonder. 
Humans should avoid reasoning without experience (Meta 981a 15). Wonder is what brings 
these features together as a puzzle, even though a person ‘feels himself ignorant for being in 
perplexity and wonder. Thus the philosopher is also a lover of myths since myths are made 
from wonders’ (Meta 982b 20). Perhaps for this reason, it is wise for teachers to nurture this 
sense of puzzlement in children (Pring, 19) for within puzzlement there is space for wonder 
but to do this children often need to become engaged in a process that apparently flows 
against the natural tide of gaining clarity about the world. Most scientists know that the more 
clarity one achieves, the less is their puzzlement. Only philosophers know that the greater the 
clarity, the greater the puzzlement.  
 
There is the suggestion that philosophy has traditionally been understood sometimes as an 
art and sometimes as a science. But as an art, or techne, it has always been caught between 
basing itself on a method of precision or a method of vagueness. There are benefits to both. It 
could opt for more technical precision such as prevails in the building of ships. If so it could 
draw on the experiences of the teknites or wood worker, the one who manufactures boats and 
ships from a plan, each item identified from start to finish, each process rolled out in a 
predictable sequence – separate wood types required for separate parts of the vessel, oak for 
the gunnel, beech for the hull, for instance. Like a boat, an argument might be built up using 
elements that are chosen to operate in particular ways, minor premises, major premises, 
quantifications logically defined by their position on the square of opposition and a range of 
logical consequential positions represented in formal logic such as modus ponens, modus 
tollens etc. In such systems the management of elements in an argument is analogous to the 
management of elements in a ship-builder’s yard, each subject to general aesthetic rules, each 
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tested according to separate performance indicators along the way. Precise art of this kind 
comes closest to scientific method when it tries at every stage to eliminate the unintended and 
the unpredicted, in order to create a total system in which every inflection has its own place. 
We do know that the science of logic requires elaborate rigour and proper consistency under 
experimental conditions in the same way that scientists use a predictable method to prove the 
hypothesis being tested, or at least, using Popper’s distinction, to prove that it has not been 
falsified. The problem with techne is that it is not always as precise as this. 
 
In a study of Plato, David Roochnik has spoken of a form of techne that is not precise, a 
stochastic or vague form which requires judgement constantly and can never theoretically 
require a closed set of theoretical conditions (Roochnik). This ‘vagueness’ sets up a set of 
experimental conditions that are very similar to the way professionals behave. In the normal 
way, learning occurs by accommodation and adaptation. The mental schema must be adjusted 
in order to enable adaptation to occur. Learning enables the learner to adjust more truthfully 
to the world by modifying those internal thoughts and beliefs that are suddenly presented as 
inadequate. These changes are often deep rooted. The physician who hazards a guess as to the 
cause of my health problem is probably correct but he or she is constantly adjusting his or her 
understanding of my health condition with each passing question and test. These guesses are 
examples of Aristotle’s view that we learn by memory upon which are built art and reasoning 
but they are similarly examples of Plato’s stochastic techne. Similarly, the courtroom judge 
may opt to believe one set of evidences and not another but is required in an adversarial 
system to listen to contradictory claims. The judgement of the judge is enhanced more by 
experience than by method. Similarly, teachers may opt for a particular set of teaching 
activities that in their judgement will improve schoolroom effectiveness only to realise that 
for this child on this day and at this moment some different strategy is required. What teaches 
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them this is experience plus art and reasoning. Learners may learn by simply adding to the 
schema they are familiar with but they may have reached a critical moment when much of 
what they assumed they knew before now has to be rethought in the light of some new set of 
conditions.  
 
I argue here that it belongs to the essence of philosophy to support both these forms of 
cognitive and moral procedure. In other words, it tolerates both the precise forms of argument 
generally thought to be basic in analytic philosophy and well as the more imprecise forms of 
thinking that are often to be seen in human judgement and observation. It is not easy to know 
whether teaching philosophy involves at any one time ‘precise’  or ‘vague’ forms of 
reasoning. Even a pragmatic stance can end up casting its concepts too robustly especially 
when National Curriculum pressures can beg the question of learning by immediately setting 
out to test a skill-set that includes a whole suite of reasoning skills, enquiry skills, creative 
thinking skills, evaluation skills (Winstanley, 2008, p. 92), skills which present a number of 
outcomes attractive to funding agencies but which also run the risk of eclipsing the 
vulnerability also required by learning.  
 
So in a certain way, the ancient question about whether philosophy is a science or an art or 
whether it is a precise art or a vague art intervenes in the modern debate about whether 
philosophy can be or should be introduced in schools. Those who opt for philosophy as art 
respect the need for logic to develop more spontaneously and in context while those insisting 
on philosophy as science insist on proper method and technique from the start. 
 
II The Postmodern Turn 
 
 9 
Moreover, the issue of vagueness versus precision might have an even more profound 
resonance if academic disciplines are neither stable nor perpetual. In What is philosophy? The 
French thinkers, Deleuze and Guattari, draw heavily on Nietzsche’s approach to human 
history. It may be possible to argue with Nietzsche that a certain existential orientation 
towards time, a certain fracture of the historical sphere from the unhistorical sphere. may be 
responsible for the philosophical concept. There is first an experience of falling into the 
abyss, as it were, at a point where humans go with the flow of life without any recognition of 
any historical time and then there is the sudden eruption of historical categories, defining one 
life as different from another, one cultural setting as different from another etc., marking out 
one time as different from another and conveying the impression that all of human life is in 
fact bounded by events and circumstances. Childhood itself marks these passages from 
unhistory into history as children learn to experience the weight of historical particularity.  
Children are told what their names are, where they come from etc. and they come to identify 
themselves with this history. In the meantime, however, the experience of unhistory breaks 
through at certain existential moments and these moments stake their claim on the uniqueness 
of the individual, breaking it away as alienated from its own historical identity in a manner 
that is envious of the life of the simple cow. This rupture of the unhistorical is acutely 
experienced during the teenage years. So a constant battle is being waged in the life of the 
teenager between two experiences of uniqueness, the experience of oneself as a historically 
embedded identity with many features like language and culture that seem essentially 
attached to one’s identity already in place and the existential experience of being entirely 
unique and unhistorically aligned with the rest of the world. And it is this experience of 
history/unhistory that Nietzsche argues is represented in philosophical reflection. 
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While these considerations are elaborated in On the uses and disadvantages of history for 
life (Nietzsche, 1983), a related perspective drawing on Nietzsche’s earlier text (The Birth of 
Tragedy) is given an interesting twist by the German philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk (Thinker 
on Stage: Nietzsche’s Materialism, trans. J.O. Daniel. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1989). Here Nietzsche is presented as a precursor of the general reconfiguration of all 
disciplines, changing them by means of some centauric magic into new hybrid instabilities – 
philology, for instance, exercised in the spirit of music, becoming a new brand of existential 
philosophy where one meditates on the events of the stage from the perspective of the chorus 
just off-stage. The metaphor of Greek tragedy is used to explicate the existential reality of 
being both on stage and reflecting on one’s life  Under this dramatic force, the elements of a 
discipline divides into the mainline activity of living and perspectival elements sprinkled in 
fragments along the path. The ‘dramatic self-ilumination of existence’, argues Sloterdijk, sets 
up a new set of oppositions, not the one predicated on theory and practice but the one 
predicated on ‘enigma and transparency’ (Sloterdijk, 1989, xxvi). The more visible, the less 
centred on the stage. In the meantime, the centauric nature of all disciplines, heralded by 
Nietzsche’s initially unsuccessful transformation of philology into philosophy, has since 
become a postmodern feature of all intellectual life. This same energetic twist   now plays 
itself out agonistically in the twenty-first century university as subjects, disciplines, schools, 
faculties and university chairs blend into one another and become cognitively transformed 
flowing onward without depositing their/ its treasures in the form of recurrent stabilities. 
Foucault was right to point to the current vulnerability of academic disciplines to these 
centauric displays as any retrenchment into traditional expressions of a discipline seem 
strangely powerless to deal with the instability of the system and the arbitrariness of its power 
plays. 
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Hence the primodiality of this groundless ground, to which Heidegger also referred, and 
which may underline all academic disciplines in a postmodern setting, brings us back to a 
sense of the origin of philosophy itself. The border lives have relevance for young children 
who are constantly on the cusp of discovering something new about the world and for 
teenagers caught between their own instinct for uniqueness and the demands of tradition 
while trying to find their own place in an old world. This positive construal of the 
unhistorical in human experience is not necessarily reflected in Nietzsche himself who held a 
singularly unromantic approach to human experience. Knowledge was continually for him a 
two-edged sword because human lives are not necessarily happy lives, unlike the simple 
unhistorical lives of cows. Accordingly, an exclusively historical profile cannot define human 
knowledge as we know it because the unhistorical will at any second break through to present 
its own authentic aspect that cannot be outmanoeuvred by any Apollonian strategy. 
 
 
 
III Deleuze and Guattari 
 
If philosophy is ‘the art of making concepts’ as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, then there is 
no contradiction between a process where initial vapours crystallise into concepts and where 
apparently finished concepts evaporate in turn into mist. And if we are talking about concepts 
that have a certain finished form already, then it is both true that philosophy has helped in 
their formation and is continuing to undermine them constantly.  The primordiality of this 
groundless ground of knowledge, especially when extended to include not only concepts but 
fields of concepts known as academic disciplines shaped by their own contours and methods, 
is further invoked by Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to a primordial plane of immanence. 
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This plane is neither fully conscious nor is it entirely unconscious. It seems in some ways to 
refer to the tradition in so far as this tradition has been absorbed and embedded in a 
community as well as the very imperfect grasp which an individual has made of it: 
 
Illusions arise from the plane itself, like vapors from a pond, like pre-Socratic exhalations 
given off by transformations of the elements that are always at work on the plane’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, 49) 
 
Perhaps to clarify matters, Deleuze and Guattari move to classify the vapours arising from the 
plane of immanence in three ways. These three modes of expression interact with one another 
and find their home in the same plane of immanence from which all thought arises and yet 
each mode is marked by a specific character.  
 
In science, the vapours appear as functions and functions tend to offer a linear profile, 
much as the structure of argument tends to be linear. Logic follows this linear model, the 
sequencing of arguments presenting a historical rhetoric. The ideas of science, however, are 
historical functions. Functions derive their power from the axioms that are assumed at the 
outset and so functions can be presented ‘as propositions in discursive systems’ (117) or as 
‘states of affairs in a system of reference’ (127). The advantage of scientific thinking is that it 
presents a well defined evidence base and its strict method of exploration expresses a 
historical species of thought. In art, by contrast, vapours appear as fabulations, or sketches or 
tracings that appear imaginatively in the mind of the artist and are then communicated by 
some performative means. The ideas of art are rarely linear and yet they do open new worlds 
and make an attempt to open an insight into reality itself. Every work of art is, our authors 
say, a monument which rather than referring to a commemoration of a past event, represents 
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‘a bloc of present sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 167). Art is capable of returning us to the first steps of human becoming because it 
enables the viewer, the reader, the listener to melt into the origins of ‘man’s nonhuman 
becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 173). Art enables this vaporous pre-human existence to 
manifest itself as a sudden interruption into the historical sense. Last there are concepts but 
concepts cannot eschew the link with the ontogenesis of the person by means of what our 
writers call ‘insistance’.  The art of making concepts involves insistence on their stability and 
on their truth, a type of ontological investment in the truth of the concept, even though in 
reality these stabilities are soon undermined and often forgotten. In this way to be engaged 
philosophically with ideas means to be engaged in the art of making concepts and this 
involves the paradox of solidification and vaporisation at the same time. We must be the 
ideas we hold and hold the ideas we are or, in other words, we must be what we know and 
know what we are. In concept making, being and knowing go together but this does not 
happen either in art or in science, since in art it is the reality of the world that appears and not 
the artist while in science arguably neither the being of the scientist nor the reality of the 
world are permitted to appear. 
 
And yet vapours follow a certain path (Deleuze and Guattari, 17). A moment of being in 
relation to a ‘calm and restful world’ is suddenly broken up by a singular event, a revelation 
of some kind. For our writers this event has the character of possibility: it presents a possible 
new world. The economy of the self immediately adjusts to accommodate itself to this new 
element (Piaget) and with it to the possibility of existing in a new world. As an example of 
this type, Nietzsche describes the experience of falling in love, while in Sartre’s early work, 
Roquentin stands in front of the root of the tree in La nausée, experiencing the nauseous 
sense of his own consciousness. Some of these experiences can be anything but pleasant. 
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Others can be liberating and life-changing. All learning should be of this latter kind, although 
we know it is not. Being attacked by a group of Chelsea supporters is likely to be an acutely 
negative learning experience. Once this new event is introduced into life’s experience, the 
economy of the self sets to work to find a place for it and it can sometimes be accommodated 
within the existing view of the world. Most times, however, the change required is of such 
significance that the self can never be the same again and a new world economy is 
established where the new event plays a significant role. One hopes that many positive 
learning moments would have this effect – a sudden insight bringing about a complete change 
in the way the learner looks at things- an art course that opens up art galleries, a religious 
experience that might lead to prayer, an experience of drama or literature that might begin the 
habit of theatre-going, an understanding of how some mechanism works that leads to some 
craft hobby, an explanation of some complex scientific theory that leads to an interest in 
laboratory research. The ‘otherness’ of this experience soon disappears within the economy 
of the self, becoming part of the identity and being of the learner and it can play a significant 
role in altering its direction and meaning. Deleuze and Guattari make much of the fact that 
the concept ‘speaks the event, not the essence of the thing’ and by so doing they invoke the 
importance of time in characterising experience in much the same way Nietzsche invoked the 
importance of time in his exploration of the historical and the unhistorical. 
 
Our writers explain this by saying that ‘[t]he plane of composition of art and the plane of 
immanence of philosophy can slip into each other to the degree that parts of one may be 
occupied by entities of the other’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 66). One example of this is the way 
that complex and abstract concepts in philosophy can be represented often better by images 
and poetry than by dialectical argument. So, for example, the myth of Er, which Plato 
borrows from his tradition, becomes the vehicle for a reflection on the nature of justice and 
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the quality of political leadership he had come across. This and other stories broaden the 
appeal of logic and ‘work’ for apparently ‘no reason’ but this may be because as stories they 
work with the ambivalence of concepts. They respect their imprecision as well as their 
clarity.  This is evidence for the claim that ‘[p]henomenology needs art as logic needs 
science...’ (p. 149) for phenomenology recognises that philosophical engagement is not a 
time for clearing up the confusions of adult language or sorting out the antinomies of reason 
but a time for encouraging the learner to confront the reality of a verbalised world. By 
undergoing this process, learners then put words on experiences that are always somewhat 
vague, separating out experiences, learning from the accounts of others, learning to ‘insist’ on 
a perspective. These features belong to the art of creating concepts, concepts which rise like 
vapours from the plane of immanence to assume a shape and a form that conceals their murky 
origins. Children come through conceptual confusions in a philosophical sense provided they 
are encouraged by the teacher to do so.  More refinements can enable learners to polish 
claims and to structure arguments. But to introduce polished claims too soon or to convey the 
impression that only polished claims count would ignore the important lessons of the vapour 
trails and the vaporous interludes through which the best of ideas must pass. 
 
For these reasons my guess is that philosophers rightly object to any purely instrumentalist 
reduction of their art, saying that rationality cannot be reduced to the paradigm of 
mathematics and geometry (Smith, 2011, p. 362) that philosophers deal with a broader 
concept of rationality that extends beyond the purely logical to include context-based 
inferences, illative as well as focal senses (Polanyi), metaphorical as well as strictly logical 
meanings and certain forms of narrative inquiry. The damage has been done when the value 
of wonder itself is replaced as a learning objective (where does it appear now?) on the 
grounds that no time is available for nebulous, vaporous aspirations of this kind. For this 
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reason, it is difficult to imagine how philosophy might be validly construed in the service of 
any set of pre-established competences. It is always tempting to make it the instrument of 
some wider campaign to improve literacy and numeracy, for instance, or serve as a helper in 
forging a more equal society? If we want to know why our children or teenagers do not think, 
why some have lost the gift of originality, why some in a murderous rage model themselves 
on fictions like Batman or the Joker, then we must look to the ways we have ensnared them 
in a totalised transparent thought system where only clarity counts. In exam-dominated 
educational subcultures this thoughtless intensification means giving priority to the 
instrument, promoting mastery of course syllabi, studying not only exam questions with great 
attention but the marking schemes which open them up to full transparency. But the current 
challenge, as Peter Sloterdijk’s version of Nietzsche has remarked, is not the divide between 
theory and practice but rather the challenge to support enigma once more in a culture of total 
transparency.  
 
In concept making a reflexive loop is essential but not essential to an artist or a scientist, 
both of whom may be ‘interested’ in what they produce but not in a position to ‘insist’ upon 
it. As a result, a concept is a particular species, a Protean reality mingling being and knowing 
and committing the philosopher to the change within the self that is identified as ‘learning’.  
It forms and unforms. It becomes definite and indefinite. It is solid and vaporous at the same 
time and this means in practice that when an idea is understood philosophically as a concept, 
its contours are probably in the process of being adjusted and potentially undermined. This 
feature picks up on the postmodern trend to identify authentic philosophical discipline as a 
process lived in the interval between the historical and the unhistorical, to refer once again to 
Nietzsche’s distinction. But it also refers back to our current dispute between ‘competence’ 
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and ‘incompetence’ theorists, both of which are correct as part of a broader package, neither 
of which is valid on its own. 
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